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Abstract
The question of the moral status of AI and the extent to which that status ought to be recognised by societal institutions is 
one that has not yet received a satisfactory answer from lawyers. This paper seeks to provide a solution to the problem by 
defending a moral foundation for the recognition of legal personhood for AI, requiring the status to be granted should a 
threshold criterion be reached. The threshold proposed will be bare, noumenal agency in the Kantian sense. Agency has been 
identified by Alan Gewirth as the source of the rights claims of our own species and, at risk of contradiction, is a foundation 
that must be expanded to all agents or else we contradict the foundation of our own rights. This is something that ought to 
be recognised through the granting of legal personhood to all noumenal agents by any system that requires such personhood 
for the enforcement of rights, or else the rule restricting legal personhood cannot be seen as a valid legal norm. Having laid 
out the case, the paper will move on to defend this natural law conception against the narrower definition of legal personhood 
proposed by Bryson et al. with regards to AI. It will argue that bare agency is a sufficient, though not necessary, criterion for 
the ascription of legal personhood in any system that sees the status as necessary for the ascription of legal rights. The paper 
will conclude by analysing the proposals currently making their way through the legislatures of the UK and European Union. 
They will be assessed for their compatibility with the claim that a functioning legal system necessarily must recognise the 
legal personhood of all noumenal agents regardless of their origins, and whether they are future-proofed for the possibility 
that AI may meet this threshold.
Keywords Legal personhood · Natural law · AI · Rights · Gewirth
1 Introduction
The question of whether AI should be granted legal person-
hood is one that has received prior scholarly attention, but 
has not yet been satisfactorily answered. Authors from Smith 
to Solum and beyond have attempted to define what it means 
to be a legal person and apply their findings to the issues 
raised by AI,1 but a problem faced by those interested in 
the question is that the concept of legal personhood is itself 
a contested idea, with comparatively little scholarship on 
its substantive boundaries or theoretical foundation beyond 
the orthodox viewpoint that the status acknowledges the 
bearer as ‘[t]he subject of rights and duties.’2 As a result, 
the possibility of granting of legal personhood to AI is a 
dilemma whose resolution is more elusive than might first 
be expected.
The purpose of is paper is to defend a metaphysical con-
ception of legal personhood grounded in the moral philoso-
phy of Alan Gewirth. This conception has at its founda-
tion the agency of the subject, and it will be proposed that 
any AI that possesses the noumenal agency required to be 
a moral patient for the purposes of Gewirth’s theories must 
be granted legal personhood by any legal system that sees 
legal personhood as necessary for the enforcement of legal 
rights. It will be argued that failure to do so would result in 
a legal rule that is incapable of providing the absolute reason 
for action that any law must necessarily claim to be capable 
of making. In providing a foundation for legal personhood 
grounded in a strong theory of Natural Law this paper will 
demonstrate that legal concepts and their normative force 
are inescapably grounded in moral norms. It is impossible 
 * Joshua Jowitt 
 joshua.jowitt@newcastle.ac.uk
1 Newcastle Law School, 21-24 Windsor Terrace, 
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK
1 Smith (1928), Solum (1992).
2 Smith, ‘Legal Personality’ (n 1) 283.
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
for legal personhood to be seen as a thing separate from a 
metaphysical criterion of personhood, and claims that argue 
otherwise are demonstrably false.
Having established the natural law case for legal per-
sonhood for AI that meet the threshold criterion of agency, 
the paper will move on to critique a contemporary denial 
of legal personhood for AI found in the writing of Bryson 
et al., which will be seen to be flawed for three reasons, each 
connected to their reluctance to view metaphysical concep-
tions of personhood unavoidably part of the legal domain. 
The paper will conclude by examining current legislative 
proposals before the UK and EU legislatures for their com-
patibility with the Gewirthian legal personhood proposed 
in earlier sections, asking whether they succeed in future 
proofing themselves against the possibility that AI may reach 
the threshold criterion required.
2  The principle of generic consistency (PGC)
This paper adopts a strong natural law position that defends 
the view that legal normativity is inescapably grounded in 
morality. This claim requires the existence of an objective, 
rationally identifiable moral standard against which the 
validity of legal norms can be assessed. In the PGC, Alan 
Gewirth claims to have identified such a supreme moral prin-
ciple; it behaves as a categorical imperative against which 
the moral permissibility of action can be identified3 and, by 
extension, the validity of legal norms and constructs can be 
assessed. It is not within the scope of this paper to mount a 
defence of the PGC.4 Rather, an outline will be offered that 
adopts Beyleveld’s subdivision of the argument into three 
steps for the clarity that it brings to the dialectically neces-
sary progression of the PGC5 before applying the argument 
to the concept of legal personhood.
The first stage begins with a statement of what it means 
to be a prospective purposive agent (hereafter PPA)—that I 
perform an action of my own volition to bring about a given 
end. This establishes the standard philosophical understand-
ing of agency as the starting point of the PGC, and was cho-
sen by Gewirth because of this alignment.6 Stage one entails 
several implicit and interconnected statements—each of 
which, at this point, remain value neutral. Firstly, the agent 
necessarily sees the end being pursued as being subjectively 
desirable or otherwise of benefit to them. If this were not 
true, the agent would not have a reason to attempt to achieve 
the end in question. Secondly, the agent necessarily requires 
a minimum level of both freedom and wellbeing to achieve 
the end. This is axiomatic of any purposive voluntary action 
beyond natural impulse of reflex, as such an action cannot 
take place if the agent does not enjoy a bare minimum level 
of personal autonomy and physical and mental wellbeing. 
Finally, the instrumental necessity of these conditions to all 
action requires the agent to recognise them as generic condi-
tions of agency (hereafter GCAs).7
Stage two builds from the identification of these GCAs. If 
GCAs are necessary for any purposive action, and purposive 
action is necessary to attain any end that might be achieved, 
then an agent must—from their own internal point of view—
see non-consensual interference with their GCAs as unde-
sirable. Thus, the agent is committed to seeing themselves 
as possessing a claim-right that their GCAs ought not to be 
interfered with.8 This conclusion is a logical consequence of 
stage one, thus making the dialectical necessity of the argu-
ment apparent; if an agent must recognise that their GCAs 
are instrumentally necessary goods that are universally nec-
essary for any purposive action, itself necessary for any end 
to be successfully attained, then that they must make claim-
rights to their GCAs is a logical consequence of the standard 
view of agency itself.
Stage three proceeds from this conclusion to universal-
ise the rights-claim made from the internal viewpoint of 
an agent. If I am committed to making a claim-right to my 
GCAs because of the necessary and unavoidable starting 
point of my agency, then all other PPAs must be capable of 
making the same rights claim. Should I refuse to acknowl-
edge that other PPAs are capable of making the same rights 
claim as myself, I undermine my own rights-claim by sug-
gesting that another PPA cannot claim rights as a result of 
their agency despite agency being the source of my own 
rights-claim.9 This should be rejected as logically inconsist-
ent, as such a rejection entails the denial of one of two truths 
established through the dialectical necessity of the argu-
ment’s progression: denial either that I myself have rights to 
my GCAs by removing the necessary grounding of rights in 
agency; or of my own agential status. As both of these deni-
als require the me to use my own agency and thus use my 
GCAs, a paradox is created where the criterion whose neces-
sity they seek to reject is itself necessary for the denial to be 
3 Gewirth (1978, 1982, 1996); Gewirth, ‘Replies to my Critics’ in 
Regis (1984).
4 This has been comprehensively undertaken elsewhere see Beylev-
eld (1991).
5 Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality (n 4) 14.
6 Engaging with the debate as to whether this is the correct view of 
what it means to be an agent is not within the purview of this paper. 
It instead assumes that, in the absence of convincing evidence to the 
contrary, it should be accepted as an accurate representation of what 
it means to be an agent.
7 Gewirth, Reason and morality (n 3) 22–63.
8 Gewirth 63–103.
9 Gewirth 104–198, esp. 104–128; Beyleveld, The dialectical neces-
sity of morality (n 4) 44–45.
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successful. The argument against universalisation therefore 
fails, and all PPAs are required to respect the claim rights of 
all other PPAs. A normative obligation has therefore been 
created whereby permissible behaviour amongst agents is 
restricted to that which does not non-consensually interfere 
with other agents’ claim rights to their GCAs.
Should AI possess such noumenal agency, it would be a 
moral patient for the purposes of the PGC. Yet ascertain-
ing whether this is the case is problematic for the observer. 
Knowing with certainty that a being other than ourselves 
is a noumenal agent is impossible; at best, we can observe 
and decide whether a being behaves as though they are an 
agent.10 But faced with the maxim behaving as a categori-
cal imperative that results from the PGC, such fence-sitting 
is undesirable. As we are required to avoid breaching its 
requirements whenever possible, a precautionary principle 
comes into play.11 Such a principle exists where we observe 
a being whose agential status is uncertain, yet who behaves 
in a way that suggests they may possess noumenal agency; 
a being that appears to act with purposiveness and volun-
tariness manifest through seeming to undertake action X 
for purpose E.12 In such a situation, the following statement 
is true:
(a) If the being is an agent, then:
 (i) If the observer treats them in a way which is 
PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour 
is morally permissible.
 (ii) If the observer treats them in a way which is not 
PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour 
is morally impermissible.
(b) If the being is not an agent, then:
 (i) If the observer treats them in a way which is 
PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour 
is morally permissible.
 (ii) If the observer treats them in a way which is not 
PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour 
is morally permissible.
Given the normative requirement that we must avoid 
behaviour that is not PGC compliant, the only course of 
action that must categorically be avoided is (a-ii). The only 
way to be certain that we avoid this outcome when the agen-
tial status of the being in question is unknown is to always 
treat the being in a way which is PGC compliant. Therefore, 
if the agential status of a being in question is unknown but 
we have reason to believe that they are behaving as though 
they are an agent, we should err on the side of caution and 
presume that they are. This is the only way to be certain that 
we avoid breaching the requirements of the PGC. The ques-
tion before us is therefore not whether or not the AI before 
us is an agent, but whether or not it possesses sufficient evi-
dence of agency so as to lead us to believe that it could be an 
agent. If so, it has valid moral claim rights as per the PGC.
Having reached this conclusion, we can turn to the ques-
tion of legal personhood for AI. The argument to follow 
holds that the claim-rights arising from the moral patient-
hood of AI that meet the threshold criterion should be seen 
as sufficient for the recognition of legal personhood, should 
that status be necessary in a legal system for legal rights to 
be recognised, adjudicated upon and enforced.
3  The PGC and legal personhood
To summarise briefly, the argument for the PGC presented 
above applies to all PPAs that, subject to the precaution-
ary principle, we have reason to believe are capable of act-
ing purposefully and voluntarily beyond reflex or natural 
impulse, and concludes with the dialectically necessary 
observation that the rights claims that result from the PGC 
are of moral concern. Given it begins from the internal 
viewpoint of the agent, it differs from other tests for moral 
patienthood in that it is based on a criterion that we pos-
sess ourselves13 rather an attempt to locate a characteristic 
of moral worth in beings to which we may wish to ascribe 
rights. A failure to ascribe rights to agents that are capable 
of making the same rights claims as those that we neces-
sarily claim for ourselves entails the logical impossibility 
of denying the importance of our own agency whilst using 
said agency to undertake the denial; this is a contradiction as 
we must necessarily value our agency and, by extension, our 
GCAs, when undertaking this—and all—action. Gewirth 
has therefore identified a principle that behaves in the same 
way as a categorical imperative that requires all agents to 
respect the GCAs of all other agents.
But should this moral concern extend to legal person-
hood for PPAs that are AI? This paper seeks to argue that 
legal personhood for such PPAs is not optional, but neces-
sary in any internally coherent legal system. To demonstrate 
this admittedly bold claim, a necessary connection between 
the PGC and legal normativity must be identified against 
10 Beyleveld (2012), 9–10; for an account of the general problem of 
the unknowability of other minds see Nagel (1974), 436–440.
11 The precautionary principle is well recognised amongst vari-
ous ethical traditions. For a full defence of the desirability of acting 
according to a precautionary principle when the moral status of a 
being is uncertain, see Sebo (2018).
12 Gewirth, Reason and morality (n 3) 27–37, 43. 13 Beyleveld, The dialectical necessity of morality (n 4) 44–45.
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which the question of the necessity of such recognition can 
be posed. Any such enquiry as to the nature of legal rules 
requires us to identify a definition of law as starting point to 
our enquiry that is equally acceptable to both positivists and 
natural lawyers requires us to look at the function of law for 
our starting point.14 Beyleveld and Brownsword have argued 
persuasively that such a starting point can be found by begin-
ning with the function and purpose of law—the subjection of 
human conduct to the governance of rules. This functional 
account is a necessary starting point as to make a claim as 
to the source of the norm in question at this stage would 
presuppose either a positivist/natural law starting point and, 
by extension, presuppose a position in the dispute that it 
seeks to resolve.15
Regardless of its source, it is axiomatic that a rule claim-
ing to be law must claim to be able to direct those to whom it 
is addressed, and equally necessary that the rule must claim 
to be absolute and override all other competing reasons for 
action. These conjoined claims are necessary as, should a 
law not claim to be an absolute reason capable of guiding 
action, it would be unable to guide the action of those who 
were not already predisposed to follow it. The necessity 
of this claim to be an absolute reason locates legal norms 
within a unified conception of practical reason; were this 
incorrect, the rule claiming to be law would be incapable 
of claiming to override all other conflicting reasons. And in 
thus situating itself within a unified conception of practical 
reason, law can be seen to operate on the same normative 
plane as moral reasons for action.16
This location requires us to establish how this claim to 
be an overriding reason for action interacts with the PGC. 
The PGC acts in the same way as a categorical imperative 
to all agents, and therefore is definitionally located at the 
top of any normative hierarchy of reasons for action. The 
consequence of this is that any direction which is not PGC 
compliant is prima facie incapable of providing an absolute 
reason to be followed. By extension, any rule pertaining to 
be law that is not PGC compliant is incapable of claiming to 
be an absolute reason to guide the action of those to whom it 
is addressed as any normative claim made by the rule would 
be superseded by the contradictory requirements of the PGC. 
Such a rule would therefore definitionally fail to be law, as 
it would be incapable of subjecting human conduct to its 
requirements.17
Having established that legal rules must be PGC com-
pliant or else they are incapable of providing an absolute 
reason to guide human conduct, we can attempt to connect 
this conclusion to the concept of legal personhood. Legal 
personhood can trace its origins to Roman law and is com-
monly accepted as being a construct designed denote that 
the legal person is the beneficiary of a bundle of legally 
enforceable rights.18 Despite recent scholars casting doubt 
on the extent to which this orthodoxy remains, if it ever 
was, a valid understanding of the concept,19 the position 
that legal personhood is necessary for the recognition of 
legal rights remains widely held. Previous work has been 
undertaken that explores the connection between the PGC 
and the concept of legal personhood,20 but space precludes a 
comprehensive account of the connection here. An overview 
of the nature of the connection would be as follows.
The PGC would require that any legal system that sees the 
status of legal personhood as necessary for the enforcement 
of rights should ascribe the status to all agents equally; to 
discriminate on grounds other than bare agency would be 
to act on an arbitrary characteristic and would not be PGC 
compliant. This is because, in doing so, the rule denying 
legal personhood to certain classes of agents (or the absence 
of an express rule extending it to them) relies on said arbi-
trary characteristic as a justificatory principle. It is therefore 
a paradigmatic example of inconsistency, as like cases are 
not being treated alike. Any rule that claimed to do so would 
therefore be incapable of providing an absolute reason as 
to why the restriction should be followed by those operat-
ing within the system. If it cannot claim to provide such 
a reason it cannot be a valid legal rule, meaning that the 
metaphysical conception of natural personhood21 grounded 
in the bare agency of the subject should be seen a sufficient 
criterion for the ascription legal personhood. It is therefore a 
logical necessity that the PGC compliant natural law theory 
outlined above requires a legal system to recognise that any 
AI that possesses noumenal agency, or that we believe to 
do so based on the precautionary principle, must in turn be 
recognised as a legal person should legal personhood be seen 
16 Capps (2009), 328.
17 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 15) 328.
18 Chen and Burgess (2019), 80, Bartosz Brożek, ‘The Troublesome 
‘Person’’ in Kurki and Pietrzykowski (2017), 8; Smith (1928), 283.
19 Kurki (2019) and Naffine (2003).
20 Jowitt (2020, in press) and Jowitt (2019).
21 Other conceptions of legal personhood exist; see inter alia Naffine, 
‘Who are Law’s Persons—from cheshire cats to responsible subjects’ 
(n 19); Naffine (2009). Attempts to dismiss metaphysics as univer-
sally relevant to the recognition of legal personhood do not account 
for the dialectically necessary argument for the PGC and should be 
rejected.
14 Many would disagree with the ability of a purely functional 
account of law to fulfil this purpose. Most recently, see Tamanaha 
(2017). Such rejections do not engage with the axiom that law must 
claim to guide human conduct; that other social institutions such as 
etiquette seek to do the same does not make it less true of law.
15 Beyleveld and Brownsword (1986), 120. For more on the desir-
ability of such an agreed referent, see Toddington (1993), 58 and 
Capps (2009), 43.
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as necessary by that system for the recognition and enforce-
ment of legal rights
4  The objection of Bryson, Diamantis, 
and Grant
If a legal system requires the status of legal personhood for a 
subject to claim legally enforceable rights, noumenal agency 
is the overriding factor in ascribing the status to beings other 
than ourselves. Such agency should be a sufficient, though 
not necessary, requirement for the recognition of legal 
personhood in any system where it is necessary that legal 
personhood be recognised for legal rights to be enforced. 
Failure to do so would breach the PGC and render any such 
limitation incapable of possessing the normative force that 
law necessarily must claim. This is the overriding natural 
law case for legal personhood for AI that we are required 
to accept.
Attempts to ground legal personhood in natural person-
hood through natural law arguments are, however, often 
rejected. Many, such as Bryson et al.22 have argued that 
pragmatic concerns about legal personhood for AI mean that 
any natural law imperative in favour of recognition should 
be overridden, and their objections will be addressed here in 
the hope that they can be shown to be misplaced both legally 
and philosophically. Their concerns can be categorised into 
three main points. Each will be dismissed in turn, beginning 
with their first. I will refer to this as the protectionist point:
While not always a zero-sum game, sometimes extend-
ing the class of legal persons can come at the expense 
of the interests of those already within it.23
The objection is that to extend rights to AI may restrict 
the ability of human beings to enjoy current legally enforce-
able rights. This objection is flawed in that it fails to engage 
with any normative claim for rights for AI, such as that out-
lined above. To give a clear example as to why this argument 
fails, we need only realise that it could have been levelled by 
former slave owners who objected to what was previously 
considered property being granted legally enforceable rights. 
These owners’ property rights were undoubtedly diminished 
by granting slaves their freedom, but this was not a good 
reason to draw the emancipatory project to a close. Natural 
Law justifications for the recognition of legal personhood 
such as that defended here are founded in the claim-rights 
of those to whom personhood is to be extended as opposed 
to existing classes of legal persons, and it is this point that 
Bryson et al. fail to acknowledge. The protectionist argument 
therefore fails to overcome the claim made by this paper.
Their second category of objections belongs to what 
appears to be a Realist position:
In many cases, though, the [legal recognition to the 
rights and obligations of entities that really are peo-
ple] will not track … metaphysical and ethical truths. 
Sometimes legal personhood may be denied to real 
people to serve odious ends, like perpetuating privi-
leges for some smaller group of People.24
This objection highlights that legal personhood is, in 
fact, a fiction. It can be granted at the discretion of the legal 
system in question, and any input as to the desirability of 
its extension from biology, sociology, ethics or any other 
external discipline is irrelevant.25 The point is more sophis-
ticated than the first, but remains flawed in that it relies on a 
notion of personhood grounded in a positivist understanding 
of legal normativity. Bryson et al. demonstrate a commit-
ment to inclusive legal positivism in their claim that ethical 
considerations regarding a given rule can only be considered 
legal if incorporated into the legal system by the legisla-
ture, rather than being a necessary condition for the legality 
of the rule in question.26 Such a commitment is something 
that is not a satisfactory agreed referent for an inquiry into 
legal personhood, as it presupposes the conclusion it seeks to 
establish.27 It is therefore inferior to the Gewirthian account 
of legal normativity established above, and the necessary 
conclusion that noumenal agency should be seen as a suffi-
cient, though not necessary, criterion for legal personhood in 
any system that sees the status as necessary for the recogni-
tion of legal rights. This conclusion allows legal systems to 
retain discretion as to whether they feel the status should be 
ascribed to non-agents, thus recognising the quasi-fictional 
element identified by Bryson. Yet it also holds a necessary 
core of recognition that the authors fail to acknowledge 
because of their positivist starting point. We are therefore 
also able to dismiss the second objection as flawed.
Their final objection is functional, in that it seeks to dem-
onstrate that the granting of legal personhood to novel beings 
is incompatible with the very purpose of a human legal sys-
tem. By focussing on the function of the phenomenon under 
consideration, Bryson et al. are attempting to circumvent our 
dismissal of their second objection and locate an agreed ref-
erent from which to construct their claim.28 They hold that 
the purpose of a human legal system is threefold as follows:
22 Bryson et al. (2017).
23 Bryson et al. (2017), 275.
24 Bryson et al. (2017), 278.
25 Bryson et al. (2017), 279.
26 Coleman (2001).
27 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 15).
28 Toddington(n 15) 58; Capps (n 15) 23, 43.
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1. to further the material interests of the legal persons it 
recognizes, and
2. to enforce as legal rights and obligations any sufficiently 
weighty moral rights and obligations, with the caveat 
that.
3. should equally weighty moral rights of two types of 
entity conflict, legal systems should give preference to 
the moral rights held by human beings.29
Again, this is not a referent upon which both sides would 
agree; those who would seek to expand personhood to AI 
provided a threshold criterion was attained would reject the 
anthropocentricity of point 3) for presupposing the conclu-
sion it seeks to establish. This objection is anticipated by 
the authors, who attempt to justify the anthropocentricity of 
their referent by acknowledging it is ‘a kind that allows for 
deference to the weighty interests of other entities, via the 
mechanism of human investment in those entities.’30 Yet this 
justificatory point appears to overlook the normative rights-
claims of those beings who may be invested in by human 
beings; it is grounded in the same protectionist logic as their 
first objection and can be rejected for the same reason. By 
extension, there is no reason to accept the anthropocentricity 
of legal systems presupposed by the referent and the objec-
tion fails to adequately counter the normative claim raised 
by those advocating for legal personhood for AI.
A foundational reason for the failure of this tripartite 
rebuttal is a reliance on a contested notion of legal person-
hood. Bryson et al. rely on an extremely narrow definition 
proposed by Solaiman, that legal personhood can only be 
granted to a being ‘that it is able to know and execute its 
rights as a legal agent, and that it is subject to legal sanctions 
ordinarily applied to humans.’31 The authors believe that AI 
would be incapable fulfilling the second criterion which, 
if accepted, could justify their anthropocentric concep-
tion of law. The criterion should be unequivocally rejected, 
however. Firstly, in introducing the arbitrary criterion of 
being subject to a legal sanction, it does not overcome the 
central claim of this paper—that legal personhood is not 
a mere artifice that can be ascribed at the discretion of a 
legal system, but is inseparable from natural personhood 
possessed through bare agency. Second, it is being blind 
to the fact that things that are incapable of being subject to 
sanction are already granted the status of legal person. Riv-
ers have already been granted this status in New Zealand32 
and India,33 and it would be conceptually impossible for 
these entities to be subject to sanctions ordinarily applied to 
humans. Similarly, the Criminal Law of many jurisdictions 
holds children to be incapable of being subject to legal sanc-
tions due to their age, but this does not remove their status 
as legal persons.34 These examples show that Solaiman is 
focussing excessively on the notion of active over passive 
legal personhood, prioritising an ability to interact with 
other legal persons over the ability to be recognised as being 
in possession of legal rights even if these rights cannot be 
claimed by the legal person themselves.35 As passive legal 
personhood detached from an active element is recognised 
as being sufficient for the recognition of legal personhood 
proper by several contemporary legal systems, the criterion 
held to be necessary by Solaiman is anything but and should 
be rejected. A being need not be capable of being subject 
to sanction for their legal personhood to be recognised. In 
the absence of a satisfactory counterargument, bare agency 
should be recognised as a sufficient though not necessary 
criterion for the recognition of legal personhood in systems 
that require the status for rights to be legally enforced.
5  Compatibility of current legislative 
proposals
As with all shifts in the scope of legal recognition of rights 
interests, the argument that has been presented is one that 
will take time to be accepted. A long struggle by human 
advocates for rights for AI may also be anticipated, with 
all the difficulties associated with extending rights to things 
traditionally seen as property.36 Yet AI is already impacting 
the law, even before it can be seen as a legitimate rights 
holder—and the law is already reforming to account for this. 
In insurance, AI is already outpacing legal rules and the 
law frequently has to catch up with technological develop-
ments.37 In Contract Law, AI can already enter into con-
tracts but debates rage as to the location of the intentional-
ity behind the agreement,38 and it has been argued that AI 
already possess a level of cognition to have rules of Tortious 
liability applied to their actions.39
35 For more on the notion of active v passive legal personhood, see 
Kurki (2019).
36 Zenor (2018), 126.
37 Cowgill (2019).
38 Dahiyat (2007).
39 Sartor (2009).
29 Bryson (n 22) 283.
30 Coleman (2001), 283.
31 Coleman (2001), 274 and Solaiman (2017).
32 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act (2017).
33 Mohd. Salim v State of Uttarakhand and others (Writ Petition 
(PIL) No.126 of 2014).
34 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s 50, as amended by Chil-
dren and Young Persons Act 1963 s 16 (1).
AI & SOCIETY 
1 3
Given the rapidity with which such technologies are 
developing, it is essential that the law move now to address 
how AI should be accounted for in law. Experience from the 
fantasy sports and tobacco industries suggests that it is desir-
able that this take place now, as market pressure generated 
by product users means that developing industries are easier 
to regulate than ones that are already established.40 This is 
a more pressing concern for the granting of legally enforce-
able rights than for traditional forms of regulation, given that 
failure to adequately protect the legitimate claim-rights of AI 
would be a breach of the moral imperative of the PGC. With 
this in mind, the final section of this article will examine 
current legislative proposals in the UK and European Union 
in turn with the aim of identifying the extent to which they 
successfully future-proof themselves by adequately address-
ing the case for legal personhood for AI constructed above.
5.1  The United Kingdom
In a recent House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee Report, legislative attitude can be identified 
by the focus of the report on how developments in AI may 
affect extant social norms. Language such as ‘Machines ver-
sus humans’41 demonstrate that the Committee is commit-
ted to an anthropocentric view of legal personhood, and in 
doing so have made the same conceptual error as Solaiman 
and Bryson et al. They do not consider the possibility that 
AI may, in future, meet the threshold criterion of noume-
nal agency and become bearers of legitimate claims to legal 
protection of those rights against human interference. In this 
regard, they are acting analogously to the slave-owner who 
cannot conceptualise the possibility that his possessions may 
be legitimate rights holders. This inability to countenance 
the possibility that AI may be legitimate rights-holders in the 
future is myopic, and a failure to adequately future-proof any 
legislation that might be passed with regards to the regula-
tion of AI.
A recent report of the House of Lords Select Commit-
tee on Artificial Intelligence is guilty of the same uncon-
scious anthropocentricity. The word ‘rights’ is used only 
sixteen times in a document of almost two-hundred pages, 
and these uses are all focussed on the impact AI may have 
on the existing rights of human persons.42 The issue of AI as 
legal persons was raised by Dr Sarah Morley and Dr David 
Lawrence of Newcastle Law School, and although the com-
mittee acknowledged that this is an issue that could be legis-
lated upon, the desirability of this step was not addressed.43 
Like their Commons counterparts, the Lords Committee has 
failed to provide suggestions that future-proof legislation in 
a way that can account for the possibility that AI may come 
to possess the noumenal agency required for PGC compliant 
legal personhood. The jurisdictions of the UK may fall foul 
of this short-sightedness by creating a situation in which 
legitimate rights-claims made by AI may be overridden by 
human interests without due consideration as to which inter-
ests are of a higher normative significance.
It is notable to contrast this legislative blindness with 
the openness to the possibility of such personhood from the 
judicial branch; the subject was addressed directly by Lord 
Hodge at a recent lecture given at the University of Edin-
burgh. Acknowledging that much legal time has been spent 
considering the ‘attribution of responsibility for the acts and 
omissions of robots,’44 he continued to the issue of person-
hood for computers. Given that English Law has recognised 
the personality of ruined temples in foreign jurisdictions,45 
he claimed [‘T]here is no reason in principle why the law 
cannot create such personality’ for Artificial Intelligence.46 
Indeed, he offered detailed proposals:
It would be possible for the machine as a separate legal 
person to own intellectual property and in turn to be 
owned by a financial institution. That institution’s 
licence or the general regulatory law could impose 
on the firm responsibility for any malfunction, if, for 
example, it had been involved in the design of the algo-
rithm. The law could confer separate legal personal-
ity on the machine by registration and require it or 
its owner to have compulsory insurance to cover its 
liability to third parties in delict (tort) or restitution. 
And as a registered person the machine could own the 
intellectual property which it created.47
Lord Hodge’s proposals are therefore similar to the 
guardianship model already used by several North American 
municipalities as a means to recognise that animals kept as 
pets are legitimate rights-holders beyond mere property,48 
and adopted as a means of protecting the rights of rivers 
previously mentioned as possessing personhood in both New 
40 Weaver (2018).
41 UK Parliament, Science and Technology Committee, Robotics and 
Artificial Intelligence (HC 2016–17, 145) 9.
42 UK Parliament, House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial 
Intelligence, AI in the UK: ready, willing and able? (HL 2017–19, 
100).
43 Weaver (2018), 99, ¶314.
44 Hodge (2019).
45 Bumper Development Corporation v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis (1991).
46 Hodge (n 44), 17.
47 Bumper Development Corporation v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis (1991).
48 Sullivan and Vietzke (2008), 44–45.
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Zealand49 and India.50 Such a development, were it to be 
adopted in the UK, would be a desirable recognition of the 
legal personhood required to protect the rights of AI. Should 
the Courts see a reason to drive the change, the Common 
Law may serve as a vehicle for the recognition of legal per-
sonhood for AI on a case by case basis where the legislature 
is reluctant to act.51 Such judicial activism may eventually 
be a catalyst for legislative action to address the issue com-
prehensively rather than on a piecemeal basis.
5.2  The European Union
EU legislative proposals expressly recognise that the law 
is playing catch-up,52 but fall foul of the same unjustified 
anthropocentricity that is seen in the UK legislature. The 
Commission recognises that ‘Europe is well placed to 
establish a distinctive form of AI that is ethically robust 
and protects the rights of individuals, firms, and society at 
large.’53—but AI is itself absent in the latter list of those 
whose rights ought to be protected. The Commission pro-
posals are therefore blind to the possibility that AI may, now 
or in the future, be legitimate rights holders.54 Similarly, 
Commission research identifies a focus is needed on the 
autonomy, identity and dignity of AI users and ethical issues 
that arise from this,55 whilst remaining silent on the point 
of whether there should be equal consideration for the same 
qualities if present in AI.
The lack of consideration for the legal rights claims of 
AI is also present in the Commission’s High Level Expert 
Group on AI, but instead of being a blind spot on the part of 
the proposers, such rights are explicitly rejected. It expressly 
states that AI systems need to be ‘human-centric, resting on 
a commitment to their use in the service of humanity and the 
common good, with the goal of improving human welfare 
and freedom.’56 This is problematic in light of the argument 
presented in the first part of this paper, as the primacy of the 
human being is merely assumed as being of central impor-
tance without any attempt at providing a normative founda-
tion for this position:
The common foundation that unites [existing human 
rights] can be understood as rooted in respect for 
human dignity – thereby reflecting what we describe 
as a “human-centric approach” in which the human 
being enjoys a unique and inalienable moral status of 
primacy in the civil, political, economic and social 
fields.57
Whilst no justification of the ‘unique status’ claimed is 
given here, the Expert Group’s guidelines on ethics and 
AI contain the following justification for maintaining this 
primacy:
The human-centric approach to AI strives to ensure 
that human values are central to the way in which AI 
systems are developed, deployed, used and monitored, 
by ensuring respect for fundamental rights, including 
those set out in the Treaties of the European Union 
and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, all of which are united by reference to a com-
mon foundation rooted in respect for human dignity, 
in which the human being enjoy a unique and inalien-
able moral status. This also entails consideration of the 
natural environment and of other living beings that are 
part of the human ecosystem, as well as a sustainable 
approach enabling the flourishing of future generations 
to come.58
This glossary definition for human centric AI is prob-
lematic for two reasons. Firstly, it is unclear how the group 
can reconcile its human centric approach with the consid-
eration of other ‘living beings’ in the final section of the 
definition. This clause is clearly inserted to demonstrate that 
such beings have been considered, but the lack of normative 
engagement with their status and how any conflict between 
human beings and other living beings would be resolved 
shows that this is mere puffery. Secondly, the fact this con-
sideration is limited to living beings shows the authors are 
unwilling to address the issue of rights for AI. On a norma-
tive level, this biocentrism is as problematic as the anthro-
pocentrism of other EU bodies and efforts should be made 
to address the omission.
EU bodies other than the Commission are similarly 
anthropocentric. A recent EU Parliament Resolution 
focussed entirely on harm that AI can do, not the status of 
any interaction between AI and human beings,59 and the EU 
Declaration of Cooperation on AI explicitly states, with no 
attempt at normative justification, that its aim is to:
49 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 ss 
18–20 (2) (New Zealand).
50 Mohd. Salim (n 33), ¶19.
51 Atiyah and Summers (1987), 134, Llewellyn (1960), 90–91 and 
Kelch 1998), 546.
52 European Commission (2019a).
53 European Commission (2019a), 10 .
54 European Commission (2019a), 8.
55 European Commission (2019a), s.6.2.1.
56 European Commission (2019b).
57 European Commission (2019b), 10.
58 European Commission (2019b), 37.
59 European Parliament (2017).
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Ensure that humans remain at the centre of the devel-
opment, deployment and decision-making of AI, pre-
vent the harmful creation and use of AI applications, 
and advance public understanding of AI.60
Were the subject of this sentiment a child or other vul-
nerable minority group, then it would rightly be considered 
indefensible, as such a position does not engage with the 
normative element of rights protection. It should be seen 
as equally indefensible to not consider the normative issue 
raised by AI that make legitimate claim-rights under the 
PGC. The EU can therefore be criticised for the same rea-
sons that Lawrence and Brazier have criticised other rights 
documents; it rests on a presumed notion that personhood is 
inherently anthropocentric, and the status of ‘rights-bearer’ 
is fixed and immovable as it was settled before current tech-
nology existed.61 The purpose of this article has been to 
demonstrate that his assumption is false. AI that are subject 
to the requirements of the PGC should be seen as legitimate 
rights-holders, and it is a necessary condition of a function-
ing legal system that this be recognised by any system that 
requires recognition of legal personhood for the enforcement 
of rights. Any serious attempt at law reform to account for 
such beings must therefore engage with this issue seriously, 
rather than avoid it for political expediency.
6  Conclusion
This paper does not seek to argue that extant AI meets the 
threshold criterion of agency required for the recognition of 
legal personhood. Rather, it asks the question looking to a 
future where the threshold criterion may be reached. Having 
established the moral case for legal personhood grounded in 
a strong conception of natural law, we can see that objec-
tions grounded in self-preservation or pragmatism do not 
overcome the normative claim contained in the moral case 
that has been developed. As such, any legal system should 
seek to future proof itself by accounting for the possibility 
that AI may reach the threshold criterion of agency that has 
been identified as a sufficient, though not necessary, crite-
rion of legal personhood in any legal system where legal 
personhood is deemed necessary for the ascription of legal 
rights. This is a future that is not inconceivable, and it is 
better that legal systems prepare themselves for it now rather 
than find themselves in breach of the moral imperative that 
has been developed. To fail to do so would be to knowingly 
revisit the mistakes of the past, in which the legal person-
hood of several classes of people were knowingly removed 
based on arbitrary criteria such as race and gender.62 Only 
the recognition of the metaphysical core of legal personhood 
can help us to avoid revisiting these past injustices against 
new categories of beings.
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